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accumulated considerable support (e.g., Leslie, 1982; Leslie and 
Keeble, 1987; Oakes and Cohen, 1990; Scholl and Tremoulet, 2000; 
Blakemore et al., 2001).
Two observations raise doubts about the hypothesis that causality 
is perceived directly and automatically. First, prolonged exposure to 
obviously causal or non-causal events changes perceptions of cau-
sality (Gruber et al., 1957; Powesland, 1959). Second, there appear 
to be individual differences in judgments of causality (Gemelli and 
Cappellini, 1958; Beasley, 1968). These ﬁ  ndings raise the possibil-
ity that the perception of causality might be learned rather than 
apprehended automatically. Several parameters contribute to the 
perception of causality (see Michotte, 1946/1963). Spatial continuity 
and temporal contiguity have received most attention in behavio-
ral, and cognitive neuroscience studies (see Scholl and Tremoulet, 
2000; Blakemore et al., 2003; Fugelsang et al., 2005; Roser et al., 2005; 
Schlottmann et al., 2006). Whereas the effect of time delays on the 
judgment of causality has often been the subject of previous research 
(e.g., Schlottmann and Shanks, 1992; Schlottmann and Anderson, 
1993; Guski and Troje, 2003; Schlottmann et al., 2006), the effect 
of movement direction has been less studied. Similar to the effect 
of increasing time delays (where small delays of 100–200 ms may 
minimize the perception of causality; see for example Schlottmann 
and Anderson, 1993), Michotte reported a parametric decline with 
increase in changes in movement direction, with causal perception 
dissipating at 90° angles. However, Beasley (1968) investigated 181 
participants and found that up to 45% of participants still described 
events with 90° angle changes as causal.
INTRODUCTION
Inferring cause and effect is central to our understanding of the 
physical world. This ability is critical in predicting future states 
and may be a fundamental feature that differentiates humans 
from animals and primates. For example, Wolpert suggests that 
causal thinking underlies the development of complex tools 
and subsequent advantages in evolutional natural selection fol-
lowed by a host of unique human achievements (see Wolpert, 
2006 or Wolpert, 2009). Philosophers and scientists have grap-
pled with how we know that one event causes another, even in 
simple events such as one billiard ball causing another to move 
(Hume, 1740/1960, 1748/1977). Hume argued that our concept 
of causality must arise from repeated experiences and associated 
relationships. He believed that sensory events could not give rise 
directly to the experience of causality, and rejected the possibility 
of causal perception.
In contrast with Hume, Michotte (1946/1963) in the mid 
twentieth century, suggested the existence of something like a 
“causal impression” (p. 255). Remarkably, his simple stimuli 
investigating the perception of physical causality corresponded 
closely to Hume’s favorite example of one billiard ball hitting 
another. Michotte named this family of events, in which Object 
A approaches and contacts Object B, followed immediately by 
movement of Object B, ‘‘launching events’’. He demonstrated 
that these simple stimuli are sufﬁ  cient to produce the percep-
tion of causality. Based on more than 100 observations, Michotte 
claimed that causality is perceived directly, a view that has since 
Space and time in perceptual causality
Benjamin Straube1,2* and Anjan Chatterjee1
1  Department of Neurology and the Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
2  Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Philipps-University Marburg, Marburg, Germany
Inferring causality is a fundamental feature of human cognition that allows us to theorize about 
and predict future states of the world. Michotte suggested that humans automatically perceive 
causality based on certain perceptual features of events. However, individual differences in 
judgments of perceptual causality cast doubt on Michotte’s view. To gain insights in the neural 
basis of individual difference in the perception of causality, our participants judged causal 
relationships in animations of a blue ball colliding with a red ball (a launching event) while fMRI-
data were acquired. Spatial continuity and temporal contiguity were varied parametrically in these 
stimuli. We did not ﬁ  nd consistent brain activation differences between trials judged as caused 
and those judged as non-caused, making it unlikely that humans have universal instantiation of 
perceptual causality in the brain. However, participants were slower to respond to and showed 
greater neural activity for violations of causality, suggesting that humans are biased to expect 
causal relationships when moving objects appear to interact. Our participants demonstrated 
considerable individual differences in their sensitivity to spatial and temporal characteristics in 
perceiving causality. These qualitative differences in sensitivity to time or space in perceiving 
causality were instantiated in individual differences in activation of the left basal ganglia or 
right parietal lobe, respectively. Thus, the perception that the movement of one object causes 
the movement of another is triggered by elemental spatial and temporal sensitivities, which 
themselves are instantiated in speciﬁ  c distinct neural networks.
Keywords: perception of causality, fMRI, spatial continuity, temporal contiguity, expectation
Edited by:
Anna C. Nobre, University of Oxford, 
UK
Reviewed by:
Jill O’Reilly, University of Oxford, UK
Jennifer T. Coull, Universite Aix-
Marseille 1, France
*Correspondence:
Benjamin Straube, Department of 
Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Philipps-
University Marburg, Rudolf-Bultmann-
Straße 8, D-35039 Marburg, Germany. 
e-mail: straubeb@med.uni-marburg.deFrontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  April 2010  | Volume 4  |  Article 28  |  2
Straube and Chatterjee  The perception of causality
In previous research, most spatial violations were deﬁ  ned as 
physical gaps between stimuli (the objects never make contact) 
(e.g., Fugelsang et al., 2005; Roser et al., 2005; Schlottmann et al., 
2006). The advantage of inducing spatial violations by variation of 
movement direction is that contact between the objects occurs in 
every event. To our knowledge, no study has investigated the brain 
processes underlying the effect of variation of the movement direc-
tion between two objects on the judgment of causality.
Recent fMRI studies have focused on increases in activation dur-
ing conditions deﬁ  ned as causal than in those deﬁ  ned as non-causal 
(Blakemore et al., 2001; Fonlupt, 2003; Fugelsang et al., 2005). This 
categorization was performed on, for example, extreme violations 
of temporal and spatial parameters and was further validated in 
separate behavioral experiments (Fugelsang et al., 2005). However, 
this procedure is insensitive to detect neural processes related to 
individual differences in sensitivity to perceptual cues used for the 
judgment of causality.
Individual differences are present when small violations of spa-
tial continuity or temporal contiguity are introduced (Schlottmann 
and Anderson, 1993). At least two kinds of individual differences in 
judging causality have been identiﬁ  ed. Firstly, the response criterion 
at which people report causal perceptions might differ (e.g., Beasley, 
1968). Secondly, the stimulus parameters that contribute to causal 
perceptions might differ (e.g., Schlottmann and Anderson, 1993). 
Whereas in the ﬁ  rst case the perceptual aspects might be similar 
across participants, in the latter case the judgments would be quali-
tatively different and might rely on different neural processes.
Questions of whether causality is perceived automatically, how 
to account for individual differences, and importantly, its neural 
instantiation remain unresolved. By parametrically varying spatial 
and temporal variables we wished to shed light on effects of spatial 
and temporal variables on the neural basis of the perception of 
causality. We tested the following alternate hypotheses. Firstly, if 
perceptual causality is automatic and universal, we predict minimal 
behavioral variability and consistent neural signatures across par-
ticipants when perceiving causality. However, if perceptual causality 
is a variable experience, we predict behavioral differences and lack of 
neural consistency across individuals when perceiving causality.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The stimuli were constructed using Strata-3D software. Each 
stimulus was 2 s long. The balls were shaded to give the impres-
sion of three dimensional objects and not ﬂ  at discs. The ﬁ  rst ball 
(colored blue) began to move 400 ms after animation onset and 
stopped moving after 1000 ms. The blue ball always rolled along 
a horizontal plane and stopped once it came into contact with 
the second ball (colored red). The red ball varied in the direction 
and the time at which it began to move (see Figure 1). Speed and 
length of trajectory were the same for both balls in all conditions. 
All stimuli were rendered and converted to the Windows Media File 
format (WMV2/PAL; frame rate = 60 frames per second, resolu-
tion = 720 × 576 pixels).
PARTICIPANTS
Sixteen healthy participants took part in the study (nine male, seven 
female, mean age 25.9 ± 3.6 years, range 22–31 years). All partici-
pants were right handed, native English speakers. All participants 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and none reported 
hearing deﬁ  cits. One male participant’s fMRI-data was excluded 
because of excessive movement during the fMRI procedure. All 
participants gave written informed consent prior to participation 
in the study. The University of Pennsylvania’s Internal Review Board 
approved the study.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Our stimuli were animated video clips of a blue ball colliding with 
a red ball (a launching event). The stimuli varied in the direction of 
the subsequent movement of the red ball (seven angles: 0°, 7.5°, 15°, 
22.5°, 30°, 45°, 60° with respect to the direction of movement of the 
blue ball) and the duration before the subsequent initial movement 
of the red ball (seven time delays: 0, 33, 67, 100, 133, 200, 267 ms) 
after contact by the blue ball. All possible combinations of angle 
changes and time delays resulted in 49 different stimulus condi-
tions (see Figure 1). Each of these 49 conditions was then ﬂ  ipped 
horizontally so that the balls were presented moving both left to 
right and right to left, resulting in a set of 98 stimuli. The videos 
were presented in random order and participants were instructed 
to judge the causal relationship between the balls (Did the blue ball 
cause the red ball to move? Yes or no). The responses were given 
with the right hand via two buttons of a non-magnetic response 
box [Index ﬁ  nger: Yes (causal); Middle ﬁ  nger: No (non-causal)]. 
Each video was followed by a ﬁ  xation cross with a variable duration 
of 2000 ms to 8000 ms (average 5000 ms).
Behavioral pilot study
We conducted a behavioral pilot experiment (n = 16) to determine 
the effectiveness of our manipulations when making judgments 
about causality. The results of the pilot experiment indicated that 
both spatial and temporal stimulus characteristics were used to 
judge causality. We found considerable variability between partici-
pants on the parameters used to make causality judgments, indicat-
ing that this task was suitable for further use in the fMRI study.
MRI DATA ACQUISITION
The video clips were presented via a mirror that reﬂ  ected the com-
puter screen. Participants wore ear plugs.
All MRI data were acquired on a Philips Achieva 3 T scanner. 
Functional images were acquired using a T2* weighted echo planar 
image sequence (TR = 3 s, TE = 30 ms, ﬂ  ip angle 90°, slice thick-
ness 3  mm, 64  ×  64 matrix, FoV 240  mm, in-plane resolution 
3.44 mm × 3.44 mm, 50 axial slices orientated parallel to the AC–
PC line covering the whole brain). Two runs of 240 volumes were 
acquired during the experiment. The onset of each trial sequence 
corresponded with scanner pulses.
MRI DATA ANALYSIS
SPM51 standard procedures and templates were used to analyze 
fMRI data. After discarding the ﬁ  rst two volumes to minimize T1-
saturation effects, all images were spatially and temporally rea-
ligned, normalized (resulting voxel size 4 × 4 × 4 mm3), smoothed 
(8 mm isotropic Gaussian ﬁ  lter) and high-pass ﬁ  ltered (cut-off 
period 128 s).
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entered into a ﬂ  exible–factorial analysis, respectively. A covariate 
(centered and in interaction with the conditions) was further 
created for the second analysis including the individual predic-
tive values of angle, delay and their interaction for the judg-
ment of causality. These regression parameters were calculated 
by logistic regression analyses2 (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989) 
predicting the judgment of causality for each participant indi-
vidually by using the stimulus parameters angle, time delay and 
their interaction.
All reported activations are corrected for multiple comparisons 
at p < 0.05 using the family wise error (FWE) correction imple-
mented in SPM5. The reported voxel coordinates of activation 
peaks are located in MNI space. For anatomical localization, the 
functional data were referenced to probabilistic cytoarchitectonic 
maps (Eickhoff et al., 2007).
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
Participants judged about half the events as causal (mean = 51.03%, 
SD 16%; range 15.31–85.57%). As expected, trials judged as causal had 
on average smaller angles and smaller time delays than non-causal tri-
als [Angle: causal mean = 20.81°, SD 6.87°, non-causal mean = 31.53°, 
Statistical analyses were performed in a two-level, mixed-effects 
procedure. Two analyses were performed. The ﬁ  rst analysis focused 
on the general differences in brain activation between trial judged 
as causal and trial judged as non-causal. Therefore, single-subject 
BOLD responses were modeled using a design matrix composed of 
the different onsets vectors of causal and non-causal judged events. 
Thus, on average 49 trials were in each condition (rage 15–83 trials; 
see behavioral results). To control for differences in stimulus char-
acteristics and reaction times between causal and non-causal events 
three linear parameters were modeled as covariates of no interest 
including the corresponding stimulus parameters for each trial: 
angle, time delay and the corresponding reaction time of the judg-
ment task. A second analysis focused on the response to stimulus 
characteristics independent of the causality judgment. Therefore, 
single-subject BOLD responses were modeled using just one onset-
vector including all events (n = 98) regardless of the judgments of 
the participants. Thus, the stimulus parameters: angle, time delay 
and their interaction (angle × time delay) were correlated with the 
amplitude of the BOLD response. Parameter estimate (β-) images 
for the HRF were calculated for each parameter and participant.
Random-effects group analyses were performed by entering 
contrast images into ﬂ  exible–factorial analyses. Firstly, contrast 
images of causal and non-causal judged trials, secondly, images 
of angle, time delay and interaction from each participant were 
FIGURE 1 | Parametric manipulation of spatial continuity and temporal 
contiguity. Illustrates the parametric violations of spatial continuity and temporal 
contiguity. All combinations of angle and time delay were presented to the subjects 
twice (once in which the balls moved left to right and once in which they moved 
right to left) in a pseudo-randomized order. For each trial the subject was instructed 
to press a button if they thought that the blue ball caused the red ball to move.
2http://statpages.org/logistic.htmlFrontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  April 2010  | Volume 4  |  Article 28  |  4
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Logistic regression analyses3 (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989) 
predicting the judgment of causality for each participant individu-
ally by using the stimulus parameters angle, time delay and their 
interaction revealed large individual differences and no consistent 
effect of the interaction of angle and time delay on judging cau-
sality. Negative coefﬁ  cients of the logistic regression parameters 
indicate that these subjects are sensitive to the speciﬁ  c parameter. 
Of the subjects 87.5% (n = 14) were sensitive to time, 75% (n = 12) 
to angle and 43.75% (n = 7) to an interaction of the two. Viewed 
differently, 62.5% (10) of the subjects were sensitive to both time 
and angle violations, 25% (4) only to time and 12.5% (2) only to 
angle. A negative coefﬁ  cient indicates that larger angles (or time 
delays) were associated with a lower probability that that stimulus 
was judged as causal.
To investigate the relationship between stimulus characteristics, 
RTs and causality judgments, individual parameters of each event 
were averaged across participants (n = 16) and correlated with 
each other. Correlation analyses revealed that stimulus parameters 
[Angle, Time delay and Interaction (Angle × Time)] were nega-
tively correlated with the judgment of causality and positive cor-
related with reaction times (Angle × CJ: r = −0.355, p < 0.001; Time 
delay × CJ: r = −0.853, p < 0.001; Int. × CJ: r = −0.720, p < 0.001; 
Angle × RT:  r = 0.217,  p = 0.032;  Time  delay × RT:  r = 0.532, 
p < 0.001; Int. × RT: r = 0.426, p < 0.001). Consequently RTs are 
negatively correlated with the judgment of causality (RT × CJ: 
r = −0.561, p < 0.001).
With regard to the logistic regression parameters we found a 
negative but not signiﬁ  cant correlation between the parameters 
for angle and time delay (r = −0.371, p = 0.17).
FIGURE 3 | Individual differences in causality judgments with regard to 
spatial and temporal violations. Illustrates the individual differences in the 
proportion of causality judgments separate for each subject and divided for angle 
and time manipulations. Each data-point represents the mean of all 14 trials 
presented with the corresponding angle or time delay. Each line corresponds to a 
single subject. S02, S04 and S15 are highlighted to illustrate the different 
response pattern. These subjects are also shown in Figure 6 (S04: blue, sensitive 
to time; S15: red, sensitive to angle; S02: green, sensitive to angle and time).
FIGURE 2 | Causal judgments in relation to stimulus characteristics. 
Illustrates the probability that a particular combination of angle and time delay 
was judged as causal. The angle manipulation is color-coded on a scale from 
dark red (no angle) to light red (60°). The error bars represent the standard 
error of the mean. 3http://statpages.org/logistic.html
SD 8.62, t(15) = −3.27, p < 0.01; Time delay: causal mean = 66.87 ms, 
SD 29.16 ms, non-causal mean = 164.67 ms, SD 27.23, t(15) = −7.81, 
p < 0.001; all two-tailed, n = 16; see Figures 2 and 3]. The descriptive 
statistics for Angle must be evaluated in relation to the overall aver-
age angle of 25.71°. The descriptive statistics for time delay must be 
evaluated in relation to the overall average time delay of 114.29 ms. 
Reaction times for non-causal judgments (mean = 1.91 s, SD = 0.18) 
were slightly longer than those for causal judgments [mean = 1.82, 
SD = 0.17 s.; t(15) = 2.08, p < 0.028; one-tailed, n = 16].Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  April 2010  | Volume 4  |  Article 28  |  5
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fMRI RESULTS
All event trials regardless of whether they were judged as causal 
or not causal when contrasted to a ﬁ  xation baseline activated a 
distributed areas of the brain including bilateral occipito- temporal 
and parietal brain regions, as well as precentral and cerebellar areas 
of the brain (see Figure 4 for illustration). The fMRI analysis con-
trasting the causal to non-causal judged trials did not reveal any 
consistent group activation patterns (at a signiﬁ  cant threshold of 
p < 0.05, FWE corrected). At a lower threshold (p < 0.001, 10 voxels, 
uncorrected) we found only activation for non-causal in contrast to 
causal judged trials within the basal ganglia (left caudate nucleus: 
MNIx,y,z = −12, 12, 12, t = 4.97, 33 voxels; right caudate nucleus: 
MNIx,y,z = 16, 16, −4, t = 5.11, 11 voxels).
In contrast to the lack of consistent group-level activation pat-
terns between causal and non-causal trials, individual differences 
in the sensitivity to spatial and/or temporal cues in judging cau-
FIGURE 4 | Common activations for causal and non-causal trials. Shows 
the group activation map for common activation (based on a conjunction null 
analysis, SPM) of causal and non-causal judged trials in contrast to baseline 
(ﬁ  xation cross) independent of increasing spatial and temporal violations and 
the individual judgment of causality. Activation maps are presented of single 
subjects render brain of SPM (left and right) and on coronal, sagittal and axial 
slices of a template brain (middle; MRIcro). L, left; R, right; F , frontal; 
O, occipital.
sality correlated with neural activity for the processing of spatial 
(increasing angle) and temporal (increasing time delay) stimulus 
characteristics. For this analysis we identiﬁ  ed, for each participant 
individually, brain regions sensitive to parametric increase in spatial 
(angle from 0 to 60°) and temporal (time delay from 0 to 256 ms) 
stimulus characteristics. Than we correlated the resulting activation 
maps with the individual predictive value of spatial and temporal 
characteristics for the judgment of causality (calculated with logis-
tic regression analysis4).
Increasing sensitivity to angle for the judgment of causality 
  correlated with increased activity predominantly in the right post-
central gyrus with cluster extensions across parts of the superior 
and inferior parietal cortex (and smaller clusters in more distributed 
4Additionally we included the interaction term (angle × time delay) in all analysis. 
However, we found no signiﬁ  cant effect of this variable.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  April 2010  | Volume 4  |  Article 28  |  6
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brain regions) (Figure 5). By contrast, increasing sensitivity to time 
delay for the judgment of causality correlated with increased activ-
ity in the basal ganglia (left putamen) (see Figure 5). Importantly, 
as illustrated in Figure 6, these results are based on correlations of 
inter-individual differences in brain activation in response to spatial 
and temporal stimulus characteristics and inter-individual differ-
ences in the stimulus parameters used for the judgment of causality. 
(For complete activation patterns of both contrasts, see Table 1).
For general effects of temporal and spatial violations at a group 
level we found three signiﬁ  cant activation patterns that differed from 
the analyses including the individual predictive values for the judg-
ments of causality. The group average of the parametric analysis of 
increase in angle and time delay revealed three areas not related to the 
judgment of causality (Angle: left temporal pole, MNIx,y,z = −40, 
12,−32, t = 6.74, 5 voxels; Time delay: left occipito-temporal junc-
tion: MNIx,y,z = −36, −56, −16, t = 6.52, 10 voxels; Interaction: left 
temporal pole, MNIx,y,z = −40, 16, −32, t = 5.95, 3 voxels). These 
differences are not surprising considering the high individual vari-
ability between subjects in these contrasts (see Figure 6).
Violations of temporal contiguity and spatial continuity led to 
longer reaction times and a reduction in the proportion of events 
judged as causal. Violations of temporal contiguity were associ-
ated with increased activity in the left putamen and violations of 
spatial continuity were correlated with more distributed activity 
with the highest activation in right postcentral gyrus with cluster 
extensions across parts of the superior and inferior parietal cortex 
(see Table 1). Individual differences in activation of these areas cor-
related with how one judged the causal relationship of the stimuli. 
We found no common activations and no signiﬁ  cant effects for the 
interaction of angle and time delay.
DISCUSSION
Humans are adept at inferring causal relationships in everyday 
life. This fundamental feature of human cognition allows us to 
theorize about and predict future states of the world. However, 
mechanisms underlying even the simple perception that the impact 
of one ball causes another to move are not well understood. Our 
study investigated the neural basis of the perception of causality 
with attention to individual differences in how spatial and temporal 
characteristics predict causality judgments.
We found bilateral occipito-parietal and frontal brain activation 
in response to ball movements, which is consistent with previous 
literature about movement perception (e.g., Billino et al., 2009), 
the perception of launching events (Blakemore et al., 2001) and 
extraction of speciﬁ  c movement parameters in event perception 
(e.g., Zacks et al., 2001, 2006; Zacks, 2004). However, we did not 
ﬁ  nd consistent brain activation differences between events judged as 
causal and those judged as non-causal. Thus, it is unlikely that uni-
versal causality related structures are engaged by the perception of 
causality. However, we did ﬁ  nd that individual differences in judging 
causality are associated with distinct neural responses. Participants 
differed in their sensitivity to spatial and temporal characteristics 
FIGURE 5 | The processing of spatial and temporal characteristics in relation 
to the judgments of causality. Shows the group activation map for the correlation 
of the processing of stimulus characteristics their individual predictive value for the 
judgment of causality. Activation maps for increasing angle and time delay for each 
subject were correlated at the group level with the predictive values of the logistic 
regression analyses for angle (red) and time delay (blue), respectively.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  April 2010  | Volume 4  |  Article 28  |  7
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of events when perceiving causal relationships. Individuals’ sensi-
tivity to spatial information when perceiving causality correlated 
with activation of the right parietal lobe, an area often implicated 
in spatial perception (Shulman et al., 1999; Keehner et al., 2006). 
Attention to path trajectories engage the dorsal visual stream (Wu 
et al., 2008) and are likely responsible for detecting violations of 
spatial continuity. By contrast, individuals’ sensitivity to time infor-
mation when judging causality correlated with increased activation 
within the left basal ganglia. The basal ganglia are implicated in the 
perception of time delays in sub- and supra-second range (see Lewis 
and Miall, 2003; Meck et al., 2008 for a review). Our results reveal 
that individual differences in perceptual causality are accompanied 
by different neural signatures depending on whether individuals are 
sensitive to time or to space. Time and space seem to be elemental 
constituents that contribute to causal perceptions.
In contrast to the focal activation of the left putamen for time 
delays predicting the judgment of causality, we found a more dis-
tributed brain network for the spatial domain. In addition to the 
right parietal lobe, the lateral and medial frontal and occipital 
and temporal brain regions were activated if differences in trajec-
tory between the balls were used to judge causality. The occipito-
 temporal activations may reﬂ  ect enhanced visual attention, which is 
possibly mediated by the frontal lobe (bilateral IFG, medial frontal 
regions; e.g., Banich et al., 2000; Thomsen et al., 2005; Buschman 
and Miller, 2007; Natale et al., 2009). The fact that we did not ﬁ  nd 
a similarly extensive network for the temporal domain may be an 
effect of the thresholds being used in the analysis. For example, 
at a higher threshold (e.g., t > 8) for the spatial contrast only the 
parietal lobe activity remains.
PREVIOUS STUDIES
Only a few studies have examined the neural bases for causal 
perception. These studies have focused on increases in activation 
during conditions deﬁ  ned as causal than in those deﬁ  ned as non-
causal (Blakemore et al., 2001; Fugelsang et al., 2005). They ﬁ  nd 
occipital and parietal region activations (Blakemore et al., 2001) 
and right hemisphere (Fugelsang et al., 2005) when perceiving 
causal relationships. Fugelsang et al. (2005) further distinguished 
FIGURE 6 | Brain activation and causality judgments of three individual 
participants. Illustration of three individual participants with different patterns 
of brain activation in response to increasing angle (red) and time delay (blue; 
left). These participants also show distinct response patterns in their 
judgments of causality (center) and corresponding predictive values of 
angle and delay from the logistic regression analyses (right). Participants 
with more activation in the basal ganglia are more likely to attend to time 
delays, whereas participants with more activity in the right parietal lobe 
were more sensitive to spatial violations (see Figure 5 for 
group analysis).Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  April 2010  | Volume 4  |  Article 28  |  8
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both common (right prefrontal) and unique (right parietal and 
right temporal) regions of activation as a function of spatial and 
temporal processing of contiguity, respectively. Medial frontal acti-
vations (Fonlupt, 2003) and left hemispheric processes have also 
been reported to reﬂ  ect inferential rather than perceptual processes 
in judging causality (Roser et al., 2005).
The discrepancies between our and previous ﬁ  ndings might 
be due to differences of the stimulus manipulation (parametric 
violations vs. condition comparison applied by Blakemore et al., 
2001; Fonlupt, 2003; Fugelsang et  al., 2005), the experimental 
design (event related vs. block design applied by Fugelsang et al., 
2005) and the insensitivity to individual differences in previous 
 studies. Importantly our design, unlike previous studies, allowed us 
to   identify stimulus driven brain responses in relation to individ-
ual differences in the perception of causality. Furthermore, in past 
research, most spatial violations were deﬁ  ned as physical distance 
between stimuli (the objects never make contact) (e.g., Fugelsang 
et al., 2005; Roser et al., 2005; Schlottmann et al., 2006), rather than 
changes in trajectory as presented here.
Our data reveal that the perception of causality is not simply a 
function of the occipito-parietal network (Blakemore et al., 2001) 
or the right hemisphere (Fugelsang et al., 2005; Roser et al., 2005). 
Rather, the neural instantiation of causality itself varies, depending 
on individual sensitivities to spatial and temporal characteristics 
of events.
NATURAL EXPECTATION
Violations of spatial continuity and temporal contiguity produced 
increase in reaction times and greater activation of speciﬁ  c brain 
regions. Spatial continuity and temporal contiguity violations appear 
to be unexpected resulting in longer processing time. Thus, causal 
perception may be the default mode when viewing two moving 
objects interacting. Past research on explicit timing (see Coull and 
Nobre, 2008) point to the role of the basal ganglia. Similarly spa-
tial cues about movement direction produce larger modulations of 
brain activation than neutral cues (with respect to a passive viewing 
baseline) in the anterior and posterior intraparietal sulcus (Shulman 
et al., 1999).
A wider angle is more salient and less expected in subjects 
sensitive to angle information. Thus, both attention and the 
processing of movement trajectory (maybe as a result of the 
attention effect) are likely to be enhanced for wider angles in 
these subjects. By contrast, attention and processing of angle 
information will be unaffected by wider angles in participants 
only sensitive to time delays, and vice versa. In this study we 
cannot completely   disentangle attention processes from spatial 
and temporal processing mechanisms. However, the distinct acti-
vation pattern between “Temporal-Participants” (basal ganglia) 
and “Spatial-Participants” (parietal lobe) suggest at least that dis-
tinct domain speciﬁ  c processes are engaged, which could include 
domain speciﬁ  c attention effects.
Table 1 | Activations related to logistic regression parameters.
Anatomical region  Cluster extend  Coordinates  No. of voxels  t-value
   x y  z   
ACTIVATION FOR INCREASING ANGLE IN RELATION TO THE PREDICTIVE VALUE OF ANGLE FOR THE JUDGMENT OF CAUSALITY
Postcentral gyrus (R)  BA 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7; SPL; IPC  36  −36 52  84  9.15
Fusiform gyrus (L)    −32  −44  −16 23  7 .44
Cerebellum (L)  BA 17 , 18; V3, V4  −8  −72  −4 14  7 .43
Inferior occipital gyrus (L)  V5  −44  −72  −4 19  7 .33
Inferior frontal gyrus (L)  p. Orbitalis  −28 24  −16 12  7.08
Inferior temporal gyrus (R)  Hipp. (EC)  36  4  −36 7  7 .07
Inferior frontal gyrus (L)  BA 44, 45  −48 20 12 8  6.92
Middle temporal gyrus (L)  ITG  −56  −44 0  13  6.82
Fusiform gyrus (R)    40  −36  −16 5  6.78
Superior medial gyrus (L)    −4 36 52 9  6.69
Inferior frontal gyrus (R)  p. Orbitalis  36  32  −8 5  6.60
Cerebellum (L)    −8  −56  −12 7  6.41
Cerebellum (R)    20  −68  −40 3  6.30
Anterior cingulate cortex (L)    −8 20 20 6  6.18
Middle temporal gyrus (L)    −40  −52 20 5  6.15
Cerebellum (R)    24  −56  −48 3  6.00
Middle orbital gyrus (R)    28  28  −16 4  5.71
Precentral gyrus (L)  BA 6, 4  −32  −28 68 3  5.51
ACTIVATION FOR INCREASING TIME DELAY IN RELATION TO THE PREDICTIVE VALUE OF TIME FOR THE JUDGMENT OF CAUSALITY
Putamen (L)    −24  −4  −4 4  6.04
Brain activation for increasing angle and time delay correlated with parameters of the logistic regression analyses (angle and time delay), respectively. Anatomical regions, 
cluster extent, corresponding coordinates, and signiﬁ  cance of the peak voxels (t-value) are shown for clusters with p < 0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons (FWE).BA, 
Brodmann area; L, left hemisphere; R, right hemisphere; Hipp, hippocampus; ITG, inferior temporal gyrus; IPC, inferior parietal cortex; SPL, superior parietal lobule.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  April 2010  | Volume 4  |  Article 28  |  9
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Schlottmann and Anderson (1993) showed differences in the kind 
of stimulus parameters that contribute to individual judgments of 
causality. They believed that the selection of a stimulus parameter for 
the rating of causality is a cognitive rather than a perceptual process. 
If this assumption is true, such a cognitive process might be corre-
lated with brain activation independent of the perceptual parameters 
of the event. Certainly, top-down processes can modulate speciﬁ  c 
perceptual processes (e.g., Buschman and Miller, 2007). However, 
such top-down processes would be expected to produce pattern of 
consistent activation independent of stimulus characteristics most 
likely within the prefrontal cortex. By contrast, if the evaluation is 
perceptually driven, then one would predict patterns of activation 
within perceptual brain regions correlating with causal judgments 
causality. Our data support the latter possibility. Different sensitivities 
in spatial and temporal perceptual systems account for individual 
differences when judging cause and effect relationships.
CONCLUSION
Debates about the nature of the perception of causality have 
spanned decades and are receiving increasing attention (see 
Wagemans et al., 2006). Our results present a combination of 
two hypotheses under consideration. Consistent with the view 
that causality can be perceived and is a universal human predis-
position, our participants were biased to infer causality when 
two objects make contact and move. However, we did not ﬁ  nd 
evidence of a universal instantiation of perceptual causality in the 
brain. Consistent with the view that the experience of causality 
varies across individuals, we found that perceptual causality is 
built upon more elemental sensitivities to spatial continuities 
and temporal contiguities. Furthermore, these sensitivities vary 
across individuals. These elemental spatial and temporal sensitivi-
ties are instantiated in distinct neural networks, which in turn 
trigger the perception that movement of one object causes the 
movement of another.
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